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Abstract 
 
The objective of global regulatory reform is to build a resilient global financial system that 
can withstand shocks and dampen, rather than amplify, their effects on the real economy. 
Lessons drawn from the recent crisis have led to specific reform proposals with concrete 
implementation plans at the international level. Yet, these proposals have raised 
concerns of relevance to Asia’s developing economies and hence require further 
attention at the regional level. We argue that global financial reform should allow for the 
enormous development challenges faced by developing countries—while ensuring that 
domestic financial regulatory systems keep abreast of global standards. This implies 
global reforms should be complemented and augmented by national and regional 
reforms, taking into account the very different characteristics of emerging economies’ 
financial systems from advanced economies. Key areas of development focus should be 
(i) balancing regulation and innovation, (ii) establishing national and cross-border crisis 
management and resolution mechanisms, (iii) preparing a comprehensive framework 
and contingency plan for financial institution failure, including consumer protection 
measures such as deposit insurance, (iv) supporting growth and development with 
particular attention to the region’s financial needs for infrastructure and for SMEs, and 
(v) reforming the international and regional financial architecture. 
 
 
Keywords: financial regulatory reform, global financial architecture, G-20, Asia, national 
and regional reform 
 
JEL Classification : E61, G1, G2, G28 
 

Global Financial Regulatory Reforms: Implications for Developing Asia  |       1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The global financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 highlighted gaps and 
weaknesses in the current international financial architecture as well as national 
regulatory systems. Two major shortcomings in the modern global financial system have 
shaped an array of possible regulatory, supervisory, and prudential reforms. First, 
supervisors failed to limit excessive risk-taking and leverage by financial institutions. 
Market failures, due in part to rapid financial innovation, discredited the regulatory model 
that relied on transparency, disclosure, and market discipline to curb inordinate risk. 
Second, the absence of well-established crisis management mechanisms both locally 
and internationally—revealed in the failure to quickly address impaired financial 
institutions—sapped confidence in the system.  
 
Against this backdrop, the objective of global regulatory reform is to build a resilient 
global financial system that can withstand shocks and dampen, rather than amplify, their 
effects on the real economy. The goal is to ultimately support vibrant economic activity 
and growth.1  There is broad agreement on the key principles of reform—bolstering 
macroprudential supervision to reduce procyclicality and guard against a build up of 
systemic risk, broadening the regulatory perimeter to include all systemically important 
financial institutions, improving international financial standards, and strengthening crisis 
resolution mechanisms. 
 
Lessons drawn from the recent crisis have led to specific reform proposals with concrete 
implementation plans at the international level. Leaders of the G-20 have committed to 
building a stronger, more globally consistent, supervisory and regulatory framework for 
the financial sector—to support sustainable growth and serve the needs of business and 
citizens. Accordingly, the G-20 has established five main principles to guide the reforms: 
(i) strengthen transparency and accountability; (ii) enhance sound regulation; (iii) 
promote integrity in financial markets; (iv) reinforce international cooperation; and (v) 
reform the financial architecture.2  
 
Under the premise of the G-20’s guiding principles, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
and its constituents have identified weaknesses and are developing reform proposals 
appropriate to today’s global financial system.3 In this respect, the G-20 and the FSB 
have thus far concentrated on a wide range of issues. The six core aspects include (i) 
building high quality capital and liquidity standards and mitigating procyclicality, (ii) 
reforming compensation practices to support financial stability, (iii) improving regulation 
of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, (iv) addressing systemically important 
financial institutions and cross-border resolutions, (v) strengthening adherence to 
                                                 
1 In addressing the causes and necessary responses to the global financial crisis, the leaders of the 
Group of Twenty (G-20) have pledged their commitment to (i) restore confidence and growth, (ii) repair 
the financial system, (iii) strengthen financial regulation, (iv) fund and reform international financial 
institution, (v) reject protectionism and promote global trade and investment, and (vi) build an inclusive, 
green, and sustainable recovery (G-20, 2008, 2009a, and 2009b). 
2 See G-20 (2010b). 
3 For a summary, see FSB (2010a, 2010b). 
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international supervisory and regulatory standards, and (vi) strengthening accounting 
standards.4  
 
In addition to these issues, the G-20 and FSB are also working toward (i) developing 
macroprudential policy frameworks and tools, (ii) addressing the differentiated nature 
and scope of regulation, (iii) establishing appropriate hedge fund regulations, (iv) 
considering regulation of credit rating agencies and how credit ratings are used, (v) 
supporting development of supervisory colleges for major cross-border financial 
institutions, and (vi) supporting the revival of securitization.5  
 
Despite the critical nature of these reforms for developed G-20 members, concerns are 
rising among developing economies that these issues tend to focus on developed 
economies with advanced financial markets. They have little direct relevance to the 
challenges facing emerging economies and financial systems, especially those with less 
developed financial systems. As a result, the global financial reform efforts risk ending 
up being largely seen as irrelevant for developing economies, rather than constructing 
concrete rules and standards that can be implemented globally.  
 
Moreover, identifying common concerns among Asia’s economies is not simple. Asia 
comprises more than 4 billion people (60% of world population) in over 40 different 
nation-states. Its vast size, huge range of cultures, political environments, historical ties, 
government, and economic systems mean that it would be difficult to generalize about 
Asia. In terms of economic development, Asia has considerable disparities—while the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan are the second and third largest 
economies globally (measured by nominal GDP in mid-2010), Mongolia, Maldives, 
Bhutan, and Timor-Leste remain among the smallest. At the same time, while Japan is a 
highly developed economy, PRC, India, and Indonesia all remain emerging economies 
with wide disparities in income levels domestically. However, across the region there is 
consensus in two areas: first, there is an overriding interest in economic growth and 
development; and second, there is the drive to create inclusive growth to support social 
stability and equity. Therefore, when considering issues related to financial regulation 
and global economic governance, these twin objectives must be central in constructing 
regional views and strategies related to domestic, regional, and global financial reform. 
 
For Asia, the key lessons of the crisis are the need to enhance mechanisms to address 
economic and financial stability, to balance and diversify economies, and to develop 
more effective domestic, regional, and global financial systems.6 Such financial systems 
must support both economic growth through financial development and stability. 
 
Based on the above, this note evaluates current G-20 proposals for financial regulatory 
and supervisory reforms, focusing on their potential impact on Asia’s emerging 
economies and financial systems. The note also identifies potential areas of adjustment 
and improvement in the proposed regulatory guidelines from the FSB and its constituent 
                                                 
4 See FSB (2010e). 
5 See FSB (2010c). 
6 See Arner & Schou-Zibell (2010). 
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organizations.7 In addition, the note seeks to identify a basis for the region’s strategic 
agenda in the G-20 framework for reform of global economic governance—focusing on 
international arrangements and institutions, including the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank, as well as the role of regional arrangements, especially in Asia. 
 
 
2.  Key Issues in the Current G-20 Regulatory Reform Agenda 
 
Reforming the regulatory environment for financial systems has been a key priority of the 
G-20 (See Appendix for the progress of G-20 financial regulatory reform agenda). G-20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors met in Busan, Republic of Korea (Korea) 
on 5 June 2010 to affirm their commitment to intensify efforts and accelerate financial 
repair and reform on the following regulatory issues: (i) develop stronger capital and 
liquidity standards; (ii) address systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs); (iii) 
ensure proper loss allocation; (iv) improve regulation of hedge funds, credit rating 
agencies, compensation practices, and OTC derivatives; and (v) strengthen global 
accounting and financial standards (G-20, 2010a). Other issues discussed include 
designing macroprudential supervisory frameworks, developing supervisory colleges for 
cross-border institutions, and resuming securitization. G-20 leaders affirmed on 26–27 
June 2010 in Toronto, Canada, their focus on these issues in the context of four ―pillars‖: 
(i) a strong regulatory framework and financial market infrastructure; (ii) effective 
supervision; (iii) resolution and addressing systemic institutions; and (iv) transparent 
international assessment and peer review (G-20, 2010b). Each of these raise specific 
issues affecting Asia’s developing economies. There is also concern over relevance—
that Asia’s developing economies and regional economic and financial arrangements are 
somewhat different than those of developed economies and thus their needs differ. 
  
2.1 Developing Stronger Capital and Liquidity Standards 
 
Capital, leverage, and liquidity standards have been a central focus of the G-20 
regulatory reform throughout the crisis, with the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) tasked to develop detailed proposals. There is broad agreement to 
strengthen prudential requirements for financial institutions that require more capital, 
higher liquidity, better risk management, and limited leverage (BCBS, 2009a and 2009b). 
The emerging focus (Basel III) combines higher and more consistent capital 
requirements, with renewed risk-weighting and assessment requirements, and liquidity 
and leverage requirements. However, there are currently disagreements over the 
context of levels and form of capital, and in relation to the nature of liquidity requirements 
and the level of leverage limitations.  
                                                 
7 The FSB comprises national regulators along with major international and regional financial institutions 
and regulatory organizations: Bank for International Settlements (BIS); European Central Bank (ECB); 
European Commission; IMF; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); World 
Bank; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS); Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS); Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS); International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS); International Accounting Standards Board (IASB); and International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The following Asia-Pacific jurisdictions are members 
of the FSB: Australia; PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; and 
Singapore. 
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Asian banking systems must work to meet international standards, although their 
relatively strong capital positions put considerably less pressure compared to their 
western counterparts.  
 
On capital, global regulators have agreed to raise the quality, consistency and 
transparency of the Tier 1 capital base. To do this, it would be advisable for the majority 
of Tier 1 capital to be in common shares and retained earnings, with deductions and 
accounting treatment (especially for provisioning) being harmonized internationally. In 
addition, all components of the capital base need to be fully disclosed.  
 
Asia’s financial institutions would be relatively less affected than United States (US) and 
European financial institutions with the new capital, liquidity and leverage requirements. 
This is due to the relatively mild impact the global financial crisis had on their balance 
sheets—and partly reflecting the positive effects of post-1997/98 Asian financial crisis 
reforms (Table 1).8 Nevertheless, rapidly developing Asian financial systems would soon 
find the new prudential requirements relevant as financial innovation and globalization 
will expose them to similar risks underlying the global financial crisis.  
 
Across Asia, developing economies will benefit from simplified capital standards, 
focusing largely on core equity (Tier 1) and debt (Tier 2). The main challenge facing 
developing Asia in terms of capital provision, however, is underdeveloped domestic and 
regional capital markets. As economies across the region grow and banks increase 
lending, there will be consequent requirements to increase capital. As a result, the 
availability of well-developed equity and debt capital markets to support bank capital will 
become an increasingly major concern.  
 
New capital adequacy requirements (CAR) should also include a leverage ratio to 
dampen excessive leverage. Clearly, excessive leverage was at the heart of the global 
financial crisis. Several mechanisms are being considered to supplement the minimum 
CAR, for example, requiring an additional capital charge linked to any mismatch in the 
asset-liability maturity structure. For developing countries, leverage standards are often 
easier to implement than the usual capital requirements, as they are both simpler and 
more transparent. In addition, while risk-weighted capital requirements potentially have 
the greatest impact in improving financial institutions’ risk management practices, 
leverage combined with clear requirements for higher levels of equity capital will likely 
contribute to financial stability. 
 
Regulators did not pay sufficient attention to the source and maturity structure funding a 
bank’s asset expansion and growth prior to the crisis. In this regard, it is also important 
to establish a minimum global standard for funding liquidity. This would include 
requirements for a stressed liquidity-coverage ratio—given that the riskiness of a bank’s 
asset is intimately linked to the bank’s funding sources and term structure.  
 
Excessive reliance on short-term funding during booms—particularly when interest costs 
and margins are low—appears to have contributed to the fragility of the financial system. 
Thus, a capital charge on the maturity mismatch from the funding of asset-liability growth 
                                                 
8 See Lee and Park (2009). 
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could help dampen banks’ reliance on short-term funds and procylicality. This means 
that banks with medium- to long-term assets that have low market liquidity—and those 
who funded these assets with short-term liabilities—must hold additional capital. The 
additional capital charge would then force banks to internalize risks from maturity 
mismatches that give rise to funding liquidity risks. A multiple of CAR set as a function of 
the months of effective mismatch between asset maturity and funding maturity, for 
example, could be used for the additional capital charge for maturity mismatches. 
 
For many developing economies in Asia, however, largely underdeveloped local 
currency bond markets pose a major challenge in requiring stronger capital and liquidity 
standards (ADB, 2010). New and strong liquidity standards could be problematic for 
developing economies, especially those with underdeveloped domestic debt markets 
with limited availability of liquid assets. Continued support for domestic and regional 
bond market development is key to promoting effective liquidity management. Enhancing 
regional initiatives, for example the Asian Bond Markets Initiative under ASEAN+3, may 
be useful in this respect. 
 
Overall, developing Asian economies would benefit from specific guidance from the 
BCBS in terms of sequencing reforms, especially combined with implementation support 
through an FSB development committee. Likewise, this is an area for the development 
of regional arrangements such as the establishment of a high-level Asian Financial 
Stability Dialogue (AFSD). Regional implementation and monitoring mechanisms, both 
through independent and peer review processes at the regional level, could add value in 
the implementation of Basel III capital standards in developing Asia.  
 
2.2 Addressing Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
 
The crisis demonstrated that nonbank financial institutions, either individually or 
collectively, can pose risks to financial stability or trigger contagion when (i) they are 
closely connected to regulated entities and/or (ii) have a concentration of assets giving 
rise to systemic risks. In dealing with SIFIs, international attention has focused, first, on 
how to define which institutions are systemically important; second, how to close gaps 
and inconsistencies across regulatory systems and approaches; and third, how to 
regulate cross-border groups through supervisory colleges (IMF, et al. 2009).  
 
How to define SIFIs? It is not always clear what constitutes a systemically important 
financial institution that could pose systemic risk because of size or market influence. 
Therefore, a set of criteria for determining SIFIs would be helpful. Efforts are being made 
to develop indicators of systemic importance based on size, complexity, and 
interconnectedness at international as well as national levels, particularly in advanced 
economies. However, necessary data and methodologies available for thorough 
assessments remain a challenge to the developing economies in Asia.  
 
Although creating a practical definition of systemic importance may still be manageable 
for an economy, additional challenges remain for developing economies. Most 
developing Asian financial systems are bank-centric, and then often concentrated in a 
small number of financial institutions (Table 2). At the same time, foreign banks may 
have strong presence in their banking systems. Some institutions, while they do not 
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necessarily pose global risks, may pose domestic and in some cases regional risks. As 
such, countries need to carefully analyze the concentration of their respective financial 
sectors and provide special regulatory attention to domestic SIFIs. A similar approach 
should be taken regionally with regional SIFIs. Overall, the more systemically significant 
an institution is—domestically, regionally, and/or internationally—the more regulatory 
attention it requires, including resolution in case of any failure. 
 
Beyond these issues, recent proposals have covered questions as to whether SIFIs 
should be broken up and whether banks should be allowed to engage in proprietary 
trading.9 Because Asia’s developing economies frequently face the different problem of 
having locally significant but internationally small financial institutions, this first approach 
of breaking up SIFIs is unlikely to find strong support in the region. Clearly, this means 
that there is a much greater need for regulatory attention to SIFIs together with the 
development of relevant, appropriate regulatory standards—and this is where technical 
assistance from international and regional multilateral development banks could be 
helpful.  
 
Similarly, in terms of limiting banks’ proprietary trading, most authorities in emerging 
Asian economies will not view this as a priority problem—as their banking systems 
remain relatively conservative and their activities remain centered on more traditional 
banking businesses. However, risks from these activities could soon become relevant 
given the region’s rapidly developing banking systems and their demand for greater 
profitability, growing sophistication, and increasing interaction with global markets (Liu, 
et al. Forthcoming). As a result, the region’s developing economies would need a set of 
guidelines for dealing with banks’ proprietary trading, carefully calibrated to financial and 
regulatory development across different economies. 
 
The growing cross-border nature of banking and financial services underscores the need 
for a coordinated oversight of international banking entities. Financial activity is 
becoming increasingly global, but regulation remains utterly national. While the 
institution of a global regulator is realistically difficult, it is important to establish a global 
framework that will mandate minimum consistency across jurisdictions in regulatory 
principles that would apply to similar markets, institutions, services, and products.  
 
Even before the crisis, there were discussions on establishing supervisory colleges for 
major cross-border financial institutions. Such colleges have now been established and 
are in operation for the largest cross-border financial institutions. They are currently 
addressing issues related to regulatory cooperation and information sharing (through 
memoranda of understanding), living wills, and contingency planning. Thus far, the focus 
appropriately has been on major cross-border SIFIs and has not extended to regional 
SIFIs (except in the context of the European Union [EU]). However, as regional banking 
systems grow in size, regional supervisory colleges for regional SIFIs should be 
established through the AFSD (and eventually perhaps an Asian Monetary Fund). 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Group of Thirty (2009). 
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2.3 Ensuring Proper Loss Allocation 
 
There is growing agreement that the financial sector should assume a fair and 
substantial share of costs associated with the financial crisis and subsequent 
government measures to repair banking systems or bail them out. A range of policy 
options have been discussed, while the G-20 is crafting guiding principles to minimize 
the use of public funds and reduce risks from financial system procyclicality. 10  
 
For developing economies, it recommended that adjusted charges relating to deposit 
insurance and customer protection arrangements may be more appropriate, combined 
with appropriate resolution arrangements including mechanisms to claw back to the 
extent possible the costs of any government assistance.  
 
A capital surcharge on SIFIs based on size, complexity, and/or interconnectedness has 
also been proposed with the aim of mitigating systemic risk. A levy on financial 
institutions is one option. A levy on the size of bank balance sheets could discourage a 
financial institution from expanding assets beyond a certain level. A levy can be imposed 
specifically on non-core bank operations, limiting expansion of banking business into 
non-core and speculative financial activities. Other alternatives include a range of 
transaction taxes or Tobin taxes. These may achieve similar purposes by reducing the 
profitability of speculative financial activities. Transaction taxes can be also applied to 
cross-border transactions associated with financial speculation. The tax revenue from 
such levies and taxes can be then used for funding possible resolution in times of 
crisis.11  
 
2.4 Improving Regulation of Hedge Funds, Credit Rating Agencies, 
Compensation Practices, and OTC Derivatives 
 
Broadening regulatory scope and increasing regulatory consistency is important at 
global, regional, and national levels (BCSB, 2010). The global financial crisis showed 
that the overall design and coverage of a regulatory system is vital to its effectiveness. 
Domestic regulatory reviews are essential, with reform to eliminate gaps and overlaps, 
avoid regulatory arbitrage, increase transparency, and improve coordination among 
relevant authorities. The crisis also highlighted the need to extend supervision over a 
wider set of market segments and institutions—especially those deemed systemically 
important. Many nonbank financial institutions—non-life insurance, hedge funds, 
monolines, private equity funds, and special investment vehicles (SIVs)—were either 
lightly regulated or unregulated.  
 
Given the central role regulatory gaps and regulatory arbitrage played in the global 
financial crisis, these issues are likely to be central to future IMF and FSB regulatory 
reviews and thus a key focus for Asian jurisdictions, especially for G-20 and FSB 
members. In Asia, particular concerns arise in the context of complex financial groups, 
                                                 
10 Upon the request of the G-20, the IMF analyzed questions relating to financial institution taxes and 
charges and recommended charges based on size as well as consideration of possible profits taxes. 
The report was submitted to the G-20 prior to the Toronto Summit. 
11 See United Nations (2009). 
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especially those of systemic significance. Lessons from the recent crisis show that 
regulatory gaps and balkanization can create issues of financial stability. An important 
aspect of constructing new regulatory regimes is to consider a system in a broad and 
integrated way. Against this backdrop, all Asian jurisdictions should undertake an in-
depth analysis of the structure and coverage of their respective regulatory systems. 
Beyond domestic reviews, regional and international reviews would also benefit, at the 
international level through the Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) or the 
FSB, and perhaps regionally through an AFSD. 
 
2.4.1 Hedge Funds and Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Reflecting the infant development stage of the hedge fund industry in Asia, the region’s 
policymakers need to ensure that application of new international regulatory standards 
and guidelines have proper allowance to support the market development. The hedge 
fund industry remains limited in many developing Asian economies. However, the region 
is certainly not insulated from the changing global financial landscape, especially the 
growing hedge fund industry. In particular, many of the region’s economies have 
consciously promoted regional financial centers, where strict adherence to international 
norms would be prerequisite to maintain competitiveness. While hedge funds are often 
causes of concern in terms of potential speculation and instability, they are also an 
important element for financial market development. They provide diversity and liquidity 
to markets. In this regard, international regulatory standards and guidelines should be 
carefully crafted to support appropriate market development.  
 
Given the increasing significance of sovereign wealth funds in the region (Table 3), 
development of international and regional regulatory guidelines could potentially be very 
valuable. Such funds also have the potential to both significantly benefit economic 
development in the region and provide a mechanism for achieving some rebalancing of 
regional financial flows by potentially better channeling regional savings into regional 
investments. While the focus to date has largely been at the international level (IWG, 
2008), there is a merit in clarifying the role of these funds as well as investment rules 
and expectations at the regional level in this regard. 
 
2.4.2 Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Misaligned incentives in credit ratings and CRAs drew major criticism during the global 
financial crisis. While there had been ongoing global efforts to review and reform the role 
and uses of credit ratings, it was the global financial crisis that prompted the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to revise of the Code of 
Conduct—adding several tighter provisions against structured finance in May 2008. The 
FSB and global standard setters have repeatedly affirmed since then their commitment 
to the review and reform CRA regulations, with the aim of establishing a globally 
consistent standard.   
  
Asia has been working to develop domestic and regional institutions for credit rating 
systems. While the momentum slowed due to the global financial crisis, these efforts 
should continue. The crisis exposed inherent dangers in relying on credit rating agencies 
to the detriment of investor and regulatory due diligence. However, the recent financial 
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instability in several EU members brought real questions about the role of international 
credit ratings and credit rating agencies—in many ways similar to the Asian financial 
crisis.  
 
There is also need for serious discussion of the merits of basing regulation solely on 
private sector credit ratings—for example, capital and institutional investor investment 
requirements. A major opportunity exists to strengthen domestic and regional credit 
rating agencies while removing excessive reliance on international credit rating agencies 
for regulatory purposes. At the same time, there will be a need to find adequate 
replacements—a role which regional credit derivatives markets could take up, if the 
trading becomes exchange based, centrally cleared, and transparent. 
 
2.4.3 Compensation and Financial Institution Corporate Governance 
 
Compensation practices have been a central G-20 focus, with the release of principles, 
implementation guidance, and FSB monitoring of compliance (FSB, 2010b). In Asia, 
where compensation is generally much lower than in advanced economies, this is 
unlikely to be seen as a major concern. While Asian G-20 members have all taken steps 
to implement new standards, it could be a potentially difficult issue for some Asian 
financial centers, as they have been relatively less affected by the crisis and stand to 
gain competitive benefits.  
 
However, compensation is only one aspect of the concern over wider corporate 
governance, particularly in the financial sector. G-20 attention to financial sector 
corporate governance more generally has greater direct relevance across emerging 
Asia. In the crisis aftermath, there has been growing support for shifting the focus of 
governance of financial institutions from sales to risks. Financial firms have begun 
strengthening internal risk management by increasing Board oversight of risk, changing 
policies and procedures to evaluate credit and trading decisions, and reforming 
compensation policies to align employee incentives to more risk-focused culture. These 
changes will likely influence the region’s corporate governance practices going forward. 
 
2.4.4 OTC Derivatives Markets 
 
While derivatives have important benefits in risk management and financial asset 
pricing, the crisis made it clear that they should not be left entirely unregulated. OTC 
derivatives markets are generally underdeveloped in the region. Most activity takes 
place in Japan; Singapore; and Hong Kong, China. In many other jurisdictions, OTC 
markets are embryonic. At this stage, there are real questions as to how much 
economies in the region should embrace OTC derivatives market development. 
Reflecting this, the region’s developing economies have been rather quiet while the US 
and Europe have taken the lead role in regulating OTC derivatives markets, covering 
regulation, clearing, and settlement.  
 
However, this is an area where Asia needs to take further steps, both domestically and 
regionally. In Asia, there are important opportunities to steer the development of the 
OTC derivatives markets on a more stable and transparent path—for example, building 
central clearing and exchange trading arrangements, and developing both regional 
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infrastructure and regional standards. Clear international consensus on regulation would 
be highly beneficial in supporting the stable future development of these markets in the 
region.  
 
As markets develop, concerns in the region will likely focus on the potential for 
speculation and thus potentially destabilizing effects on financial and economic 
conditions—concerns brought into focus by the recent instability in Europe and the 
region’s collective memory of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. The region’s both 
developed and developing economies are likely to support mechanisms to reduce 
volatility arising from these new markets. For example, although credit default swaps 
should not be banned altogether, they should be subject to appropriate regulation. 
Measures could include trading them on the exchange where possible, in addition to 
central clearing, settlement, and disclosure. 
 
2.5 Strengthening Global Accounting and Financial Standards 
 
2.5.1 Accounting Standards 
 
The G-20 has repeatedly affirmed commitment to developing a single set of international 
accounting standards. Currently, the focus of discussion is on the scope of fair value—
mark-to-market versus a wider fair value based on longer-term historical value. A broad 
range of issues also exist as to how to harmonize different accounting and regulatory 
treatments in relation to capital, off-balance sheet assets, and provisioning.  
 
At the same time, most economies in Asia have or are in the process of bringing their 
domestic accounting systems into line with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) (Table 4). However, gaps remain significant (Table 5) and there is continuing 
need to build accounting infrastructure across the region in line with international 
standards. Developing countries in particular can benefit from implementing international 
accounting standards, with regional support for implementation and related human 
capital development essential for effectiveness. 
 
2.5.2 Adherence to International Supervisory and Regulatory Standards 
 
Following the Asian financial crisis, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was established 
along with the FSAP to coordinate standard development and implementation. In the 
wake of the global financial crisis, the FSF was transformed into the FSB and supported 
by a new G-20/FSB review process—in addition to strengthening the FSAP system.12 
The region actively adopted international standards and financial regulatory reform 
following the Asian financial crisis. Compliance with core principles for effective banking 
supervision is in progress, enacted, and intended in many economies in Asia and the 
Pacific (Table 6).  
 
Looking forward, the FSB process should be strengthened by expanding into a proper 
international self-regulatory organization. In addition, the IMF should be given a specific 
mandate under its Articles of Agreement to address financial stability, which would 
                                                 
12 See FSB (2010a). 
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enhance the effectiveness of the FSAP process. At the domestic level, authorities across 
the region will require technical assistance to implement standards. International 
standards should be developed further at the regional level, with regional support for 
implementation and regional monitoring, potentially through an Asian Monetary Fund 
incorporating the AFSD, Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and its 
associated ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Surveillance Office (AMRO). 
 
2.6 Other Issues 
 
2.6.1 Macroprudential Supervision 
 
The major objective of macroprudential supervision is to maintain financial stability. This 
requires a reshaping of regulatory systems so that authorities are able to identify and 
take account of systemic risks. The scope of regulation and oversight should extend to 
SIFIs, instruments, and markets. They should include nonbank financial institutions, and 
credit rating agencies to ensure they meet international codes of good practice, 
particularly to prevent unacceptable conflicts of interest. In addition, prudential standards 
must be designed to address both cross-sectional dimensions (how risk is distributed 
across a financial system) and time dimensions (how aggregate risk evolves over time) 
to build buffers for use in bad times.  
 
The macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation should also be 
complemented and reinforced by effective monetary policy. Financial excess is 
essentially a macroeconomic problem. Maintaining medium- to long-term price stability is 
usually considered to be the overarching objective of monetary policy. Price stability in 
general promotes financial stability, and a sound financial system would contribute to 
price stability and macroeconomic stability. In the aftermath of the global economic 
crisis, however, many policymakers and commentators have suggested that central 
banks should pay greater attention to the financial sector and financial excess, and take 
financial stability as a statutory objective. For example, monetary policy could put more 
emphasis on macrofinancial risks. This implies a ―preemptive tightening‖ to try to reduce 
procyclicality and to prevent dangerous excesses from building in asset and credit 
markets, even if inflation appears to be largely under control. This includes an attempt to 
―lean against‖ an upturn of the credit cycle rather than relying on cleaning up after a 
bubble bursts.  
 
There is urgent need to design and implement an effective macroprudential supervisory 
framework. As the global financial crisis demonstrated, there is a complex interplay 
between monetary policy, fiscal policy, and supervision and regulation, domestically, 
regionally, and globally. Monetary policy and macroprudential supervision should play 
complementary roles, with fiscal and structural policies play their part in mitigating 
systemic risks. This requires a proper mechanism allowing domestic regulators, central 
bankers, and policymakers to share information, cooperate and, if necessary, coordinate 
policies. They also need to effectively communicate with the public in one voice. But 
finding an appropriate mechanism for a particular economy is not an always easy task. 
 
A key challenge is instituting a macroprudential supervisory framework and developing 
appropriate tools for supervisors in developing economies. Strengthening international or 
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regional surveillance mechanisms can help by complementing and augmenting relatively 
weak national monitoring systems in many developing economies across the region. 
 
2.6.2 Supervisory Colleges for Major Cross-Border Financial Institutions 
 
As noted above, while supervisory colleges have now been implemented for major 
international cross-border financial institutions, there is a need to address major regional 
financial institutions through similar arrangements, as is now being done in the EU. In 
Asia, as financial institutions become increasingly active regionally, supervisory 
arrangements will need to be developed in a parallel fashion, with the AFSD potentially 
playing the coordinating role. 
 
2.6.3 Securitization and Bond Market Development 
 
Securitization remains largely underdeveloped in emerging Asia, lagging far behind the 
US or Europe (Figure 1). 13  While debt market development remains an important 
objective regionally and domestically, the use of securitization has been generally limited 
for various reasons, including inadequate legal and regulatory support, along with poor 
market infrastructure.  
 
Vibrant local currency bond markets are essential for efficient allocation of the region’s 
vast resources. The development of local currency bond markets also has the potential 
to mitigate the global shortage of sound and liquid financial assets; lessen the probability 
that a currency depreciation will morph into a full blown financial crisis; and reduce 
massive inflows into, for example, US debt securities and hence help unwind global 
imbalances. In addition, developed local currency bond markets can reduce the reliance 
on foreign currency debt—and its concomitant currency mismatches, thus reducing the 
burden of having to hold large foreign exchange reserves in many developing 
economies in the region.  
 
Looking forward, regional and national progress toward more transparency and 
disclosure, centralized trading, and investor due diligence can support market 
development, financial stability, and economic growth. Here, regional initiatives have 
proved most helpful as seen in the marked progress in the development of local 
currency bond markets reflecting the efforts under the ASEAN+3 Asian Bond Markets 
Initiative (Figure 2). Despite the progress, however, corporate bond issuance is still 
lagging, hence requiring further policy attention. Another area with strong potential, 
especially in the context of the region’s bank centric financial systems, is covered bonds. 
 
 
3. Balancing Regulation and Innovation 
 
The key challenge for regulators in emerging Asia is how to encourage and manage 
financial market development without stifling innovation. Ideal regulation leaves space 
for innovation, although unfettered innovation can generate risks of its own. The 
                                                 
13 See Lee and Park (2008). 
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experience of past crises suggests caution. But translating caution into regulatory strait-
jackets stifles innovation. And this has its own costs. Striking the right balance is the 
challenge, and it is not an easy one.  
 
Crises highlight the importance of adequate monitoring of financial innovation. 
Regulators should be wary of complex innovations that make the underlying risks of 
products or services more difficult to assess or trace—whether by bank management, 
regulators, or investors. Innovative products also lack the historic data needed to apply 
appropriate stress testing. Regulators need to assess the impact of innovative products 
on the safety and soundness of financial institutions, risk management, investor 
protection, and financial stability in general. 
 
An important distinction should be made between the basic elements of financial market 
development and risky financial innovation. Many economies in the region continue to 
face the challenge of developing financial markets to efficiently channel domestic 
savings into productive investment. Moreover, much of the region still lacks essential 
financial services—authorities need to encourage greater public access to banking; 
provide credit to promote entrepreneurship; diversify savings instruments; and develop 
appropriate products to manage risk. 
 
For emerging Asia, where banks remain the main channel for financial intermediation, 
building strong banking systems remains paramount. However, authorities must also 
foster a broader range of markets—including corporate bond markets, securitization, 
covered bonds, and derivatives—to enhance financial system resilience. Many 
economies also need to establish, upgrade, or reform basic market infrastructure for 
trading and settlement, all of which will help promote more efficient financial 
transactions. 
 
 
4. Establishing National and Cross-border Crisis Management 
and Resolution Mechanisms 
 
Globally, the financial crisis highlighted that, in addition to effective monetary policy, 
economies need effective arrangements to ensure financial stability—not only for crisis 
prevention, but for crisis resolution. Clearly, Asian economies must review existing 
liquidity provision arrangements to address coverage, scope (especially relating to 
collateral availability), and moral hazard. Asian governments had to intervene to a lesser 
extent than those in the US and Europe. But based on the responses to the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis and the recent global crisis, advance planning, especially for 
resolving major financial institutional failure—whether domestic or foreign—is prudent 
and necessary.  
 
A comprehensive framework and contingency plan for financial institution failure is 
needed, including consumer protection measures such as deposit insurance. Clear 
consensus on building appropriate institutional arrangements and systems would be 
valuable. Simulations that identify possible consequences of both local and international 
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financial institution failures, as well as market volatility, would help in establishing 
advance contingency plans. 
 
In reforming crisis management frameworks, remedial or corrective actions need to be 
harmonized, particularly for large and systemic cross-border financial institutions. In the 
early stages of the recent crisis, there were issues with cross-border movements of 
funds and assets to support liquidity or capital requirements of either the parent entity or 
the subsidiary/branch. To fix this, regulators need to take a broader view of liquidity 
requirements for cross-border banks and apply a more consistent set of liquidity 
parameters for them. Disruptive regulatory actions—such as the ring-fencing of liquid 
assets in the recent crisis—should be used only as a last resort. This requires better 
knowledge of how cross-border banks conduct business. Complex, large cross-border 
banks internally manage liquidity in very diverse ways. Host and home supervisory and 
regulatory authorities need to ensure that these banks hold sufficiently high-quality liquid 
assets. 
 
The crisis showed that insolvency regimes need to be aligned across economies 
affected by cross-border bank failures. Delays and uncertainties during the height of the 
crisis increased uncertainty and exacerbated contagion. For example, measures and 
processes for managing insolvent banks requiring close out netting, managing creditor 
claims on collateral assets, or unwinding financial transactions are often designed for 
domestic operations. A strengthened resolution framework would also help forestall 
unilateral actions tantamount to financial protectionism. There is a clear need for better 
information sharing and cross-border burden sharing on costs—for example in the case 
of work out operations, mergers, or liquidation of cross-border banking businesses. 
 
The resolution of cross-border institutions and questions of burden-sharing have 
different context for emerging economies. In particular, foreign banks make up an 
important portion of the domestic financial system in many developing economies. Any 
failure of these thus raises real financial stability questions for the host financial system, 
even when the institution is not necessarily systemically significant internationally or 
even in its home jurisdiction. In this context, there would be great benefit in building 
international or at least regional approaches to address issues arising from foreign 
financial institution participation in developing financial systems. We recognize the need 
to establish regulations including capital requirements for domestic subsidiaries and 
branches of foreign banks. However, they should be formulated in a way that they do not 
give undue advantage or disadvantage to foreign banks over domestic banks. 
 
 
5. Supporting Growth and Development 
 
An appropriately designed institutional framework for finance is needed to achieve the 
twin objectives of supporting economic growth and financial stability. First, a reliable 
institutional framework defines the rules of the game for financial transactions and 
supports financial sector development. Without an appropriate legal and institutional 
framework, effective finance cannot develop. Second, weak financial sectors have been 
a significant cause of many financial crises, including the Asian financial crisis and the 
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recent global financial crisis. Well-established legal and regulatory framework can 
strengthen financial intermediaries and help prevent crises. Third, it is necessary to 
develop an effective framework to help resolve financial distress or crisis. Without a solid 
structure, crisis resolution is more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. This again is 
the primary focus of the G-20. 
 
Emerging Asia’s underdeveloped financial systems remain an important hurdle to 
funding necessary development and ensuring sustained high growth. Financial systems 
need to be strengthened for more efficient resource allocation. The region’s financial 
needs for infrastructure and for SMEs are particularly significant.  
 
An important issue in bank financing of infrastructure is asset-liability mismatches. While 
infrastructure typically involves long-term finance, banks rely heavily on deposits as their 
main source of funds. With banks continuing as the major funding source for the region, 
this asset-liability mismatch problem becomes especially acute. The relatively limited 
presence of insurance companies, pension, and provident funds also constrain sources 
of long-term finance in the region. 
 
Financing SMEs is another critical development issue. For many emerging Asian 
economies, SMEs are the main pillars of production and job creation. Many SMEs in the 
region need more effective financial assistance for hedging against foreign exchange 
volatility and trade finance. At this stage, it is important to encourage simple innovations 
to provide a better menu of financial services and products catering to the needs of small 
entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
While more structural reforms are underway to broaden and deepen the region’s 
financial systems, their effect will be gradual given the long-term nature of reform. In 
addition, policy reforms are needed to improve investment climates across emerging 
Asia. Policies that promote SMEs and services also help. Governments should lower 
entry barriers facing new firms; ensure level-playing fields for domestically-oriented firms 
versus export industries; and promote competition including the liberalization of key 
sectors. 
 
Across emerging Asia, financial sector development will support growth in the context of 
financial stability. Efforts should initially focus on developing clear international 
guidelines for developing effective and efficient finance. These include building the 
foundations for finance and financial infrastructure, especially effective payment 
systems, clear and transparent property rights, information infrastructure such as credit 
information system and corporate governance, including insolvency arrangements, and 
dispute resolution.  
 
The BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS are now all revising their respective core principles with a 
greater focus on ―preconditions‖ that take into account differing regulatory systems and 
stages of development. Across much of emerging Asia, these preconditions (foundations 
and infrastructure) remain a central development focus. The region’s banking systems 
need to extend their reach to a broader portion of the population, especially to SMEs and 
through continued development of microfinance. For securities markets, infrastructure, 
transparency, and corporate governance are central for both development and financial 
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stability, and in both equity and debt markets. In insurance, major opportunities exist for 
developing pension and contractual savings arrangements to better employ financial 
savings and build the social safety nets needed to support growth, development, and 
stability across the region. 
 
 
6. Reforming the International and Regional Financial 
Architecture 
 
Currently, there is a need to improve and streamline the region’s regulatory and 
supervisory regimes, reinforcing global efforts at revamping the financial architecture to 
avoid a repeat of the crisis. Asia’s banks held up well compared with banks in many 
advanced economies because of their relatively low exposure to subprime mortgages. 
Nevertheless, enhancing the strength of the system remains paramount. Capital 
adequacy requirements must be increased. Regulators need to fully assess the impact 
of innovative products on both the micro- and macro-prudential soundness of financial 
institutions, risk management, investor protection, and systemic financial stability. 
 
6.1 Reform of International Financial Institutions 
 
Given previous crisis experience, emerging Asia has a keen interest in reforming 
international financial institutions—especially the IMF—and the international financial 
architecture in general. Developing countries face direct financial and economic impact 
from international economic and financial volatility and are vulnerable to any loss of 
confidence globally or regionally. The IMF reform to keep up with the real challenges of 
financial globalization is central. Likewise, international support for regional 
arrangements is extremely valuable, particularly in light of recent crises in European and 
the implications for new Asian arrangements such as the CMIM. 
 
6.2 Addressing Capital Flows 
 
The potential of speculative capital flows pose policy challenges to many developing 
Asian economies. The links between capital flows, credit expansion—lending booms 
with capital account liberalization—and adverse macroeconomic consequences are not 
new to the region’s emerging economies. A surge in capital inflows could complicate 
macroeconomic management, especially as many economies are beginning to 
normalize policies related to crisis response.  
 
Managing capital flows must be done judiciously to ensure that external volatility does 
not disrupt domestic financial markets. An appropriate policy package includes currency 
flexibility, a clear and stable monetary and fiscal policy, and enhanced regulatory and 
supervisory efforts to prevent asset bubbles. Authorities should also communicate 
clearly and effectively with market participants, which could affect policy outcomes. 
Regional cooperation and coordination can also be crucial to managing capital flows. 
The establishment of regional financial stability dialogue, i.e. AFSD can help the 
authorities to address the region’s common interests and concerns. 
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International support and guidance in monitoring and managing capital flows would be 
helpful for the region’s developing economies. And this is an area where the IMF and/or 
other global and regional multilateral developing banks can provide important advice and 
technical support.  
 
6.3 Effective Regional Financial Architecture 
 
Asia needs to take its rightful place in the new global financial architecture by actively 
participating and taking on greater responsibility in developing appropriate supervisory 
and regulatory structures for the region and the world. As such, Asia needs to make its 
voice heard in international forums for debating the future of the global economy and 
reforming the global financial architecture.  
 
Emerging Asia must play its part in ensuring the new financial architecture meets both 
the challenges of globalized finance and the region’s financial development agenda. 
There are three important areas for regional cooperation: (i) liquidity provision—CMIM; 
(ii) macroeconomic and financial surveillance—AMRO; (iii) regional bond market 
development—Asian Bond Markets Initiative; and (4) regional financial stability 
dialogue—AFSD.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The early crisis response was necessarily reactive, rather than focusing 
comprehensively on the financial sector role in financial stability, sustainable growth, and 
economic development. Now it is time to forge a clear agenda to guide longer-term 
reform domestically, regionally, and globally.  
 
First, the G-20 has thus far focused on a range of specific regulatory issues arising 
directly from weaknesses identified as a result of the global financial crisis. In terms of 
supporting financial stability, however, there is merit in taking a more comprehensive 
approach rather than addressing selected issues on a piecemeal basis.  
 
Second, the crisis presents a real opportunity to redesign the international financial 
architecture to better address the realities of a global financial system, including the 
needs of developing Asia. It is essential to reform the mandate of the IMF and to design 
arrangements to support not only financial stability but also financial development at the 
international level.  
 
Financial systems appear to be inherently subject to periodic financial crises.14  The 
international financial architecture (as well as regional financial architectures) should be 
designed to address the nature of global finance and the characteristics of periodic 
crises. Likewise, in a world with an increasing range of regional economic and financial 
arrangements (including in Asia), the international architecture should be designed to 
support both individual domestic economies and financial systems and regional 
arrangements. 
                                                 
14 See Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). 
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Third, looking forward, developing Asia would benefit from the establishment of wider 
regional and sub-regional mechanisms to support regional economic and financial 
cooperation, coordination, assistance, and monitoring. In particular, these mechanisms 
could serve a central role in advocating regional interests in the context of global 
organizations such as the G-20, FSB, and IMF. The CMIM and associated AMRO 
provides a mechanism for regional economic monitoring, with the ASEAN+3 dialogue 
process an example of a possible forum for reaching regional consensus on issues 
being addressed in global forums.  
 
Finally, continuing work to establish an AFSD to develop a consensus on regulatory 
concerns has real potential value. Support of relevant international institutions such as 
the IMF, BIS, and OECD could play a pivotal role in the establishment of AFSD, with the 
regional institutions providing technical assistance and other support in furthering these 
regional initiatives. 
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Table 1: Banking Soundness Indicators (%) 
 
 
Nonperforming 
Loans to Total 
Loans1 
Bank Regulatory 
to Capital Risk 
Weighted 
Assets2 
Bank Provisions 
to Nonperforming 
Loans3 
Private Sector 
Loans to 
Deposit Ratio4 
 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
China, People’s Rep. of 22.4 1.6 13.5 10.0 4.7 115.0 95.2 72.6 
Hong Kong, China 7.3 1.3 17.9 16.8 — — 66.7 49.1 
India 12.8 2.4 11.1 13.2 — 52.6 63.0 71.4 
Indonesia 20.1 3.3 21.6 17.4 36.1 127.4 40.6 75.1 
Korea, Rep. of 6.6 0.8 6.7 11.4 81.8 125.2 111.5 126.3 
Malaysia 8.3 1.8 11.3 13.5 57.2 95.6 109.4 91.6 
Philippines 15.1 3.0 16.2 16.0 43.6 112.3 82.0 58.6 
Singapore 3.4 2.5 16.4 13.5 87.2 91.0 99.7 77.9 
Taipei,China 5.3 1.2 10.8 8.6 24.1 95.7 82.0 60.6 
Thailand 17.7 4.8 7.5 11.7  47.2 99.4 101.6 95.2 
Average5  11.9 2.3 13.3 13.2 47.7 106.0 84.2 77.9 
Median 10.5 2.1 12.4 13.3 45.4 99.4 88.6 73.9 
         
Memo         
eurozone — 2.4 — 8.3 — — 135.0 134.7 
Japan 5.3 1.9 11.7 15.8 35.5 27.1 83.5 70.1 
United States 1.1 5.4 9.4 11.7  146.4  58.3 111.5 109.1 
 
— = data not available.  
1. Data for commercial banks, except for Hong Kong, China (authorized institutions); Rep. of Korea (commercial and 
specialized banks); Singapore; Taipei,China;  urozone (banking system); Japan (major banks) and United States 
(all FDIC-insured institutions). 
2. Data for commercial banks, except for People’s Rep. of China in 2009 (banking system); Hong Kong, China 
(authorized institutions); India; Singapore; Taipei,China;  urozone (banking system); Rep. of Korea (commercial 
and specialized banks); Japan (major banks); and United States (all FDIC-insured institutions). Values for Rep. of 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taipei,China, Thailand and United States are Tier-1 capital to risk-weighted assets; 
and for the rest, total capital. 
3. Data for commercial banks, except for India; Indonesia; Rep. of Korea; Singapore; Taipei,China; (banking system); 
Japan (major banks); and United States (all FDIC-insured institutions). Value for India in 2009 as of end-2008; 
Indonesia in 2009 as of April 2009; and Rep. of Korea and Japan in 2009 as of September 2009. 
4. Data covers loans of the private sector or nonfinancial corporations; and deposits of banking insitutions, other 
depository corporations, or deposit money banks. 
5. Simple average. 
 
Source: Global Financial Stability Report (various years) and International Financial Statistics, International Monetary 
Fund; CEIC database; and national sources. 
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Table 2: Size and Composition of Financial Systems in Selected Asian Economies 
(% of GDP) 
 
 
Financial Sector Assets1 
Stock Market 
Capitalization2 
Total Bonds 
Outstanding3 Deposit-taking Financial 
Institutions 
Non-Bank 
Financial 
Institutions 
 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
China, People’s Rep. of 157.2 200.6 5.1 5.8 48.9 82.7 16.9 52.3 
Hong Kong, China 505.5 651.7 188.3 459.0 368.3 1,093.9 35.8 68.4 
India4 64.5 103.5 15.6 29.0 69.9 205.2 24.6 48.8 
Indonesia 63.6 34.7 8.7 11.4 16.2 39.8 31.9 18.2 
Korea, Rep. of 130.5 158.6 41.9 67.3 27.8 100.3 66.6 122.7 
Malaysia 154.2 211.5 41.4 99.9 120.6 149.5 73.3 96.5 
Philippines 99.2 83.1 23.9 20.0 33.3 53.6 27.6 39.2 
Singapore 646.3 643.7 76.6 83.9 167.3 271.7 48.0 84.7 
Taipei,China 256.0 295.6 29.4 92.2 75.9 173.5 37.7 57.5 
Thailand 132.3 146.6 10.7 41.1  23.8 67.1 25.3 67.0 
Average5  221.0 253.0 44.2 92.0 95.2 223.7 38.8 65.5 
Median 143.2 179.6 26.6 54.2 59.4 124.9 33.8 62.2 
         
Memo         
eurozone 230.9 315.6 157.8 214.5 79.6 56.5 87.9 114.4 
Japan 510.8 541.8 274.7 291.3 67.6 69.7 97.4 189.6 
United States 79.6 107.9 279.3 314.1 152.1 105.8 138.0 175.8 
 
— = data not available.  
1. Financial asset data for Indonesia as of end-2001 and end-2008. 
2. Figures are computed using US dollar values of stock market capitalization and gross domestic product; except for 
China, People’s Rep. of and India computed using local currency unit. 
3. Data covers domestic debt securities. Figures for the United States exclude non-marketable government 
securities. 
4. Financial sector assets data for India refers to the end of fiscal year. 
5. Simple average.  
 
Source: OREI staff calculations using data from national sources, CEIC, AsianBondsOnline, Bank for International 
Settlements, World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, and World Federation of Exchanges. 
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Table 3: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Developing Asia 
 
Economy Name of Fund Assets  (USD billion) 
Year of 
Inception 
China, People’s Rep. of China Investment Corporation 200 2007 
Hong Kong, China Investment Portfolio (HKMA) 100 1998 
India to be named N/A N/A 
Korea, Republic of Korea Investment Corporation 20 2005 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional BHD 15 1993 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 330 1981 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 100 1974 
Taipei,China National Stabilization Fund 15 2000 
Thailand to be named N/A N/A 
        Note: The list includes non-commodity sovereign wealth funds only. 
        Source: Park and Rosanov (2010). 
 
 
Table 4: Compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards—Asia and 
the Pacific 
 
 Full Compliance Compliance in Progress Enacted Intent Declared No Compliance
East and Southeast Asia
People's Rep. of China 
Hong Kong, China 
Indonesia 
Republic of Korea 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taipei,China 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
South Asia
Bangladesh 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Central Asia
Kazakhstan 
The Pacific
Australia 
New Zealand 
Source: EStandards Forum.
Source: eStandards Forum. 
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Table 5: International Financial Reporting Standards Gaps—Asia and the Pacific 
Standards Gap Compliance Gap
East and Southeast Asia
Cambodia
NAS were developed based on IAS 2002 (with some 
adaptations or modifications) but have not been expanded or 
updated for several years.
Gaps were noted in several areas including presentation of 
financial statements, impairment of losses, and disclosure of 
accounting policies.
People's Rep. of China
NAS and IFRS are generally comparable, except for standards 
related to reversal of impairment losses and disclosure of 
related party relationships. Full convergence with IFRS is 
expected by 2012.
Several FS reviewed showed high compliance. Examples of 
noncompliance found in classification of leases and 
disclosure of debt restructuring.
Indonesia
Convergence between NAS and IFRS was ongoing at the time 
the report was written; full adoption planned in 2008. 
(compliance gap analysis not performed)
Republic of Korea
NAS are largely consistent with IFRS; main differences are on 
consolidation and absence of standard for special purpose 
entities. Full adoption of IFRS is mandatory for all listed Fis and 
selected unlisted FIs starting 2011.
Analysis indicated overall compliance with most standards, 
although scope of review only covered disclosure 
requirements.
Lao PDR
Significant differences between NAS and IFRS were observed. 
New standards are being developed based on IFRS 2003 but 
supporting legislation has not been issued.
FS reviewed largely complied with NAS.
Mongolia No NAS—all entities are mandated to adopt and follow IFRS.
Most of FS analyzed do not meet IFRS requirements. Critical 
gaps were found in the areas of income taxes; valuation of 
property, plant, and equipment; and consolidation of FS, 
among others.
Philippines Adoption of IFRS was completed in 2005, with minor changes.
Findings demonstrate incomplete or inadequate disclosure in 
some FS. Violations were found in areas such as submission 
of consolidated FS and disclosure of accounting policies and 
related party transactions.
Thailand
NAS are undergoing review and revision to reduce gap with 
IFRS.
Evidence of noncompliance were found in several areas 
including revenue recognition and FS consolidation.
South Asia
Bangladesh
NAS were developed based on IAS but, as revisions were 
made, these were not updated and some IAS have no 
counterparts in the NAS.
Critical gaps were noted in FS consolidation, statement of 
changes in equity, and revenue recognition, among others.
India
NAS are broadly aligned with IAS but differences were 
observed in terms of scope and level of details. IAS not yet 
adopted are under review, except for IAS 29 (Financial 
Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies) which was not 
deemed applicable in local ci
Compliance with standards has improved over the past 
decades but deviations were still observed. Noncompliance 
was noted in areas such as segment reporting and profit 
calculation for purposes of exeuctive remuneration.
Pakistan
Most of applicable IFRS have been adopted, except IAS 29 and 
41 (Agriculture).
Significant improvements were observed in recent years but 
violations were still found. Examples include noncompliance in 
terms of inventory valuation and disclosure and presentation of 
preference shares.
Countries
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          Table 5: continued 
 Standards Gap Compliance Gap
Sri Lanka
NAS are largely aligned with IFRS although gaps exist due to 
nonadoption of certain IAS and introduction of an alternative 
method that is not allowed by IAS.
Improvements were noted but findings reveal several 
instances of compliance gaps, many related to disclosure 
requirements and related party transactions.
Central Asia
Azerbaijan
Law which requires development and implementation of NAS 
based on IFRS was recently adopted at the time the report was 
written; development of new standards is still in nascent 
stages.
With respect to the review of FS which claim to abide by IFRS, 
evidence of noncompliance were noted particularly in FS 
prepared by the enterprise sector.
Georgia
IFRS or IFRS-based standards are recognized by law but late 
and poor translation of IFRS and override by regulators (e.g., in 
terms of tax accounting) led to differences in standards. 
IFRS is compliance generally weak, although the level of 
compliance in the banking and insurance sectors was much 
better than in the enterprise sector. 
Kazakhstan
Majority of NAS are based on an IFRS equivalent but significant 
deviations arise as some NAS have no IFRS equivalent and 
some areas addressed by IFRS are not covered by an 
equivalent NAS.
FS review showed general compliance with IFRS. Areas of 
noncompliance include determination of fair value of financial 
assets and liabilities and impairment of financial assets. 
Kyrgyz Republic
Legal framework mandates that FS be prepared in accordance 
with IFRS but there is no provision for offical translation, 
adoption, and publication of IFRS. The transition plan indicates 
that all local companies should use IFRS by 2009.
The quality of FS analyzed falls short of IFRS requirements, 
with some FS lacking notes to the accounts. Another source of 
variation from IFRS stems from differences in national 
regulation's treatment of loan loss allowances.
Tajikistan All business entities are required to use IFRS by 2010.
The report only conducted compliance gap analysis against 
NAS; majority of IFRS have no equivalent in the local standards.
Uzbekistan
NAS are being developed based on IFRS but only standards 
which do not contradict with Uzbek civil, company, and tax laws 
are adopted. Banks follow a different set of standards issued 
by the central bank.
Evidence of noncompliance was found, especially in terms of 
preparation of explanatory notes and public availability of 
general purpose FS.
The Pacific
Australia
IFRS adopted in 2005 but standards specific to local 
circumstances have been retained to deal with certain issues, 
including disclosure of director and executive remuneration 
and concise financial reports.
(compliance gap analysis not performed)
New Zealand Companies required to apply IFRS starting 2007. (compliance gap analysis not performed)
The sample size of ROSCs is very limited so assessments should not be considered representative of overall compliance. 
Countries
Source: World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes  (various countries). International Monetary Fund, Financial System Stability Assessment  (for 
Australia and New  Zealand). Latest reports available as of 10 August 2010 w ere used.
FI = f inancial institution, FS = f inancial statements, IAS = International Accounting Standards, IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standards, NAS = national accounting 
standards.
Note: IFRS are issued by International Accounting Standards Board, an independent accounting standard-setter based in London. In April 2001, IASB announced that it w ill adopt 
all IAS released by its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee. IAS and IFRS are used interchangably in this table.
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Table 6: Compliance with Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision—Asia and the Pacific 
 
Full Compliance Compliance in Progress Enacted Intent Declared No Compliance
Insufficient 
Information
East and Southeast Asia
People's Rep. of China 
Hong Kong, China 
Indonesia 
Republic of Korea 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taipei,China 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
South Asia
Bangladesh 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Central Asia
Kazakhstan 
The Pacific
Australia 
New Zealand 
Source: EStandards Forum.
 
              
             Source : eStandards Forum. 
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Figure 1: Private-Label Securitization Issuance (USD billion) 
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Note: Data includes asset-backed commercial paper, asset-backed security (ABS), collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO), mortgage-backed security (MBS) and CDOs backed by CDO, ABS, and MBS.
Global issuance covers Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latin America, United States and 
other emerging markets.
Asia issuance includes Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Source: Global Financial Stability Report October 2009 , International Monetary Fund.
 
 
Figure 2:  Total Government and Corporate Bonds  
Outstanding—East Asia (USD billion) 
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Source: AsianBondsOnline.
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Appendix: Progress of Selected Features of the G-20 Financial Regulatory Reform Agenda 
 
Issue 
Commitments 
Status 
Washington Summit London Summit Pittsburgh Summit 
International  
Cooperation 
Establishment of 
supervisory colleges for 
all major cross-border 
financial institutions to 
strengthen surveillance 
of cross-border firms. 
  
(no new  
commitments) 
Supervisory colleges established in 
more than 30 large, complex financial 
institutions identified as requiring 
college arrangements. Roles and 
effectivity of operations undergoing 
review by FSB [Sept. 09]. 
 
Strengthened cross-
border crisis 
management 
arrangements. 
Review of resolution 
regimes and bankruptcy 
laws to allow orderly 
wind-down of large and 
complex cross-border 
financial institutions. 
Immediate implementation 
of FSB Principles for Cross-
Border Cooperation on 
Crisis Management. 
Firm-specific, cross-border contingency 
planning discussions held to discuss 
contingency funding and de-risking 
[Sept. 09].  
 
FSB to draft common principles to 
facilitate greater consistency among 
national resolution frameworks and to 
strengthen coordination of resolution 
measures; need for some national 
discretion to give authorities space to 
tailor regulatory and supervisory actions 
to domestic conditions acknowledged 
[Jun. 10].  
 
Key recommendations on cross-border 
bank resolution issued by BCBS for 
implementation [Jun. 10]. 
 
  
Conduct of early warning 
exercises to identify and 
report on build up of 
macroeconomic and 
financial risks and 
recommend actions to 
address them. 
Second iteration of the Early Warning 
Exercise conducted and presented to 
the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee [Sept. 09]. 
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Issue 
Commitments 
Status 
Washington Summit
 
London Summit
 
Pittsburgh Summit
 
 
Prudential 
Regulation 
Development of policies 
to better manage liquidity 
risk in financial 
institutions. 
Development of a global 
framework for promoting 
stronger liquidity buffers in 
financial institutions 
(including cross-border 
institutions). 
Implementation of measures 
to mitigate procyclicality, 
which requires banks to 
build buffers they can draw 
from when market conditions 
worsen.  
 
(no new commitments) BCBS to prepare in time for the Seoul 
Summit calibrated proposals for new 
regulatory framework, which includes 
raising the quantity, quality, 
consistency, and transparency of the 
Tier 1 capital base; strengthen risk 
coverage of capital framework; 
introduction of leverage ratio as a 
supplementary measure to the risk-
based requirements; and introduction of 
a global minimum liquidty standard 
[Jun. 10].  
 
BCBS proposed additional 
requirements to strengthen capital 
treatment and risk management 
requirements of structured products 
[Dec. 09].  
 
All member countries will adopt new 
Basel II standards with aim of 
implementation by end-2012 [Jun. 10]. 
 
Standardization of 
definitions of capital to 
achieve consistent 
measures of capital and 
capital adequacy.
 
Progressive adoption of 
Basel II capital framework by 
all member countries.
 
Drafting of rules to 
discourage excessive 
leverage and improve of 
the quality, quantity, and 
international consistency of 
capital in the banking 
system (action to be taken 
once recovery sets in).
 
 
 
  
Conduct of robust, 
transparent stress tests for EU to publicly release results of 
ongoin
Appendix continued 
EU to publicly release results of 
banks, where needed.
EU to publicly release results of 
ongoing stress test on European banks 
[Jun. 10].
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Issue 
Commitments 
Status 
Washington Summit London Summit Pittsburgh Summit 
  
 
Scope of 
Regulation
 
Reduction of systemic 
risks of credit default 
swaps (CDS) and OTC 
derivates transactions 
and stronger efforts 
toward standardization 
and resilience of credit 
derivatives markets. 
(no new commitments) (no new commitments) Major derivatives dealers committed to 
achieve specific target levels for central 
clearing of OTC credit derivatives by 
end-October 2009 and OTC interest 
rate derivatives by end-December 
2009. CDS standardization moving 
forward with publication of supplements 
to the ISDA's 2003 Credit Derivatives 
Definitions. OTC Derivatives 
Regulators' Forum close to finalizing an 
international cooperative oversight 
framework for the global CDS trade 
repository [Nov. 09]. 
 
 
Review of the scope of 
financial regulation, 
focusing on institutions, 
instruments, and markets 
that are currently 
unregulated. 
Creation of guidelines to 
determine whether a 
financial institution, market, 
or instrument is 
systematically important. 
Expansion of regulation and 
oversight to all systemically 
important financial 
institutions (SIFIs), 
instruments, and markets. 
(no new commitments) IMF, BIS, and FSB submitted guidelines 
on how national authorities can assess 
the systemic importance of financial 
institutions, markets, or instruments 
[Nov. 09].  
 
FSB to develop concrete policy 
recommendations to address problems 
associated with SIFIs (particularly moral 
hazard problems) by the Seoul Summit 
[Jun. 10].  
 
FSB considering additional prudential 
requirements for SIFIs, such as capital 
and/or liquidity surcharges and use of 
contingent capital [Jun. 10]. 
 
Registration of hedge funds 
or their managers and 
(no new commitments) Legislation to establish registration, 
reporting, and oversight arrangements 
Appendix continued 
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Issue 
Commitments 
Status 
Washington Summit London Summit Pittsburgh Summit 
disclosure of relevant 
information to evaluate 
systemic risks.  
 
for hedge funds/advisers advancing in 
major jurisdictions, notably the EU and 
US [Jun. 10]. 
Establishment of central 
clearing counterparties to 
promote standardization and 
resilience of credit 
derivatives markets 
Trading of all standardized 
OTC derivative contracts 
on exchanges or electronic 
platforms, where 
appropriate, and clearance 
through central 
counterparties (CCPs). 
OTC derivative contracts 
should be reported to trade 
repositories. 
 
Guidance on application of existing 
CCP standards and establishment of 
trade repositories in OTC derivatives 
markets published for comments by 
CPSS and IOSCO [Jun. 10]. 
Transparent 
Assessment of 
Regulatory 
Regimes 
Review and submission 
of Financial Sector 
Assessment Program 
(FSAP) report on each 
member country's 
regulatory system. 
(no new commitments) (no new commitments) FSB members to undergo FSAP 
assessment every five years, participate 
in thematic and peer reviews, and 
publish results of these assessments 
[Jun. 10]. Furthermore, members are 
also subject to assessment through 
Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) [Nov. 
09]. 
 
Compensation Avoidance (through 
voluntary effort or 
regulatory action) of 
compensation packages 
which reward excessive 
short-term returns or risk 
taking. 
Implementation of FSB's 
new principles on 
compensation; BCBS should 
integrate these principles 
into their risk management 
guidance. 
Assessment of firms' 
compensation policies, with 
application of necessary 
disciplinary actions which 
(no new commitments) FSB found considerable progress 
across the board with regard to 
implementation of its principles and 
standards on compensation. Further 
recommendations include enhanced 
supervisory cooperation on 
compensation with regard to cross-
border firms, support in the 
development of sound industry 
practices especially in the area of risk-
Appendix continued 
Washington Summit
Scope of 
Regulation
Review of the scope of 
financial regulation, 
focusing on institutions, 
instruments, and markets 
that are currently 
unregulated.
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Issue 
Commitments 
Status 
Washington Summit London Summit Pittsburgh Summit 
can include increased 
capital requirement. 
adjustment of compensation, and 
increased coverage of significant 
nonbank financial institutions [Jun. 10]. 
 
BCBS incorporated FSB Principles in 
Pillar 2 of Basel II [Nov. 09]. 
Tax Havens and 
Non-Cooperative 
Jurisdictions 
Continuation of FATF's 
work against money 
laundering and terrorist 
financing. 
Strengthened compliance 
with international standards 
in prudential, tax, and anti-
money laundering/terrorist 
financing. 
 
Identification of non-
cooperative jurisdictions 
(with regard to standards in 
tax transparency) and 
implementation of 
disciplinary action as 
necessary.  
(no new commitments) Public statement on jurisdictions with 
strategic deficiencies issued by FATF 
[Feb. 10]. 
 
Global Forum on Tax Transparency and 
Exchange of Information (Global 
Forum) launched peer review process 
and developed multilateral mechanisms 
for information exchange [Apr. 10]. 
 
All 87 jurisdictions covered by Global 
Forum have committed to standards of 
tax information exchange and 
transparency, with more than half 
having substantially implemented them 
[Nov. 09]. 
 
Promotion of tax 
information exchange. 
Accounting 
Standards 
Improvement of valuation 
standards, accounting 
and disclosure standards 
for off-balance sheet 
vehicle, and disclosure of 
complex financial 
instruments by firms to 
market participants.  
Improvement of accounting 
recognition of loan-loss 
provisions by incorporating a 
broader range of credit 
information. 
(no new commitments) Progress in FSB recommendations on 
impairment of financial assets, 
derecognition, addressing valuation 
uncertainty in fair value measurement 
guidance, and netting/offsetting of 
financial instruments [Jun. 10].  
 
Final standard on fair value 
measurement expected in 2010 [Nov. 
09].  
 
Appendix continued 
Compensation
Avoidance (through 
voluntary effort or 
regulatory action) of 
compensation packages 
which reward excess
short-term returns or risk 
taking.
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Issue 
Commitments 
Status 
Washington Summit London Summit Pittsburgh Summit 
Accounting 
Standards 
Creation and consistent 
application and 
enforcement of a single 
set of quality global 
standards. 
(no new commitments) International accounting 
bodies should heighten 
efforts to achieve a single 
set of global accounting 
standards by June 2011. 
IFRSs and US GAAP to converge the 
greatest extent possible by June 2011 
[Nov. 09]. Most FSB members have 
either adopted IASB standards or have 
programs underway to converge with or 
consider adoption of IASB standards by 
2012 [Jun. 10].  
Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRAs) 
CRAs should satisfy 
standards set by the 
international organization 
of securities regulators, 
provide greater 
disclosure to investors 
and to issuers, and 
differentiate ratings for 
complex products.  
CRAs should differentiate 
ratings for structured 
products and provide full 
disclosure of their ratings 
track record and the 
information and assumption 
that underpin the ratings 
process. 
(no new commitments) CRAs under IOSCO review working to 
incorporate IOSCO CRA Code 
provisions into their codes of conduct 
[Mar. 09]. National and regional 
initiatives ongoing or underway to 
strengthen oversight of CRAs; US, EU, 
and Japan have entered into 
discussions to resolve any significant 
inconsistencies that may surface from 
their new CRA regulations [Jun. 10]. 
 
 
Regulatory oversight of all 
CRAs whose ratings are 
used for regulatory purposes 
and compliance with the 
IOSCO code. 
(no new commitments) BCBS to address inappropriate 
incentives caused by use of external 
ratings in the regulatory capital 
framework (to avoid "cliff" effects).  
 
National and regional authorities also 
taking or considering steps to lessen 
undue reliance on ratings in rules and 
regulations [Jun. 10]. 
 
 
Appendix continued 
BCBS = Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; BIS = Bank for International Settlements; CPSS = Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems; EU = European 
Union; FATF = Financial Acton Task Force on Money Laundering; FSB = Financial Stability Board; GAAP = Generally Accepted Accounting Principles; IASB = International 
Accounting Standards Board; IFRSs = International Reporting Financial Standards; IMF = International Monetary Fund; IOSCO = International Organization of Securities 
Commissions; ISDA = International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.; OTC = over the counter; US = United States. 
 
Sources: Group of Twenty, Declaration: Special Leaders Summit on the Financial Situation, Action Plan for Recovery and Reform, Statement: G-20 Summit Pittsburgh, and 
Communique: G-20 Summit Toronto. US Chair of the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit, Progress Report on the Actions to Promote Financial Regulatory Reform. UK Chair of the 
London G-20 Summit, Progress Report on the Economic and Financial Actions of the London, Washington, and Pittsburgh G-20 Summits. Financial Stability Board, 
Overview of the Progress in the Implementation of the G-20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability.  
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